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Because China’s economic structure is different from that in OECD countries, using conventional
neo-classical competitive trade models to analyze the welfare and trade impacts of trade related policy
change can be misleading. In particular, both the exchange rate regime and output and pricing policies
of state owned enterprises (SOE’s) will have effects on trade and welfare which differ from a classical
competitive model. This paper present a numerical model that captures the combined and interactive
effects of three policy elements in prototype form of tariffs, policy towards SOEs in the industrial
sector, and an exchange rate regime supporting large trade surpluses and additions to foreign reserves.
The model has non neutral monetary features, endogenous trade imbalances and average product pricing
of labor in goods. We do not claim it to be fully representative of modern China, but it does go some
way beyond simple competitive models used elsewhere and points to different conclusions of policy
impact. We calibrate our model to 2006 data, and then evaluate the impacts both singly and in combination
of: tariff liberalization, a move to more freely floating exchange rates, and SOE enterprise reform.
Results show that large differences in policy impacts relative to a classical competitive model. SOE
reform and a freely floating Chinese exchange rate have more impact on China’s welfare than tariff
liberalization. Policies of RMB appreciation and increasing China’s money stock reduce China’s trade
surplus. In the traditional competitive model, trade liberalization impacts both imports and exports,
while in our central case model, with endogenously determined trade surplus, trade liberalization has
little effect on exports. Most of the policy impact is on imports and the trade surplus. SOE reform
of China’s manufacturing sector significantly decreases production of China’s manufacturing sector
and increases production in China’s other sectors.
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1.  Introduction 
The center piece of Western neo-classical economic analysis is the Arrow-Debreu 
competitive equilibrium model. It has been used in numerical form to describe both Western 
and Chinese economies despite China’s economy being quite different in structure. Notably 
China is in transition from a central-planned economy to a market economy, and other 
elements complicate analysis, such as SOEs , and the exchange rate regime. Here, we present a 
calibrated numerical model of China with SOE production, non neutral monetary and exchange 
rate structure, and analyze the impacts of different liberalization policies, not only tariff 
liberalization, but also RMB appreciation and SOE reform, either singly or in combination. 
Our conclusion is that using simple competitive trade models with ad-valorem tariff equivalent 
representation of all policies can be misleading. 
 
In the model, for the manufacturing SOE sector, we use a version of the  managerial 
control model of SOEs in Whalley & Zhang(2006) and Fosse & Raimondos-Møller(2009), in 
which SOEs are assumed to be under managerial control with managers politically appointed. 
Capital is assumed allocated freely to the SOE by credit rationing with a state bank 
recapitalization mechanism covering any losses. We assume that enterprise managers 
maximize personal gain from networking and political connections, and enterprise managers 
maximize enterprise size rather than profits. The implication is that if managers hire labour in a 
competitive labour market (a strong but greatly simplifying assumption for the Chinese case) 
and pay labour its going wage, they will hire labour up to the point that the product price 
equals the average value product of labour, rather than the marginal value product as in the 
competitive case. We also add monetary structure into a trade model, as in Wang & 
Whalley(2007), to reflect a managed Chinese exchange rate and monetary regime with a peg 
and RMB inconvertibility. Monetary policy is thus non accommodative to the chosen fixed 
exchange rate, and this implies either excess supply of foreign exchange which the Central 
Bank accommodates as additions to reserves .  
 
We calibrate this model to 2006 base year data for two countries, China and the Rest of the 
World. Our base case includes 2006 trade, production, and consumption and constructed   4
money supply data. We then use the calibrated model to simulate the impacts of the 3 types of 
policy change on welfare, trade flows, the trade surplus and production. These cover tariff 
liberalization, exchange rate and monetary policy (Renminbi appreciation and /or increases in 
the money stock), and SOE reform. 
 
Results show that tariff liberalization increases imports but has no impact on exports and 
is welfare improving as the surplus falls. The results for RMB appreciation and monetary 
policy have effects on exports but are small and reduce trade imbalances and are also welfare 
improving.SOE reform only has significant trade and welfare impacts in the absence of 
monetary non neutralities. 
 
Most of the available literature on Chinese SOEs uses econometric models with no 
explicit trade and monetary structure, assessing the performance, profitability and labor hiring 
(examples are Bigsten, Liu, and Zhang (2002), Cull and Xu (2003), and Liu (2002)). And 
while there is literature analyzing interactions between trade structure and monetary policy, 
they use tariff equivalents and analyze trade policy changes either ignoring monetary 
structure(such as IMF(2005), Wilenbockel(2006)), or trade impacts of exchange rate changes 
in structures where trade pattern changes do not follow from a trade model (such as 
Park(2005),Kamada &Takagawa(2005),Marquez & Schindler(2006)).  
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2.  A Prototype Model Capturing Some Key Chinese Features 
We analyze the potential impacts of different liberalization policies, tariff liberalization, 
RMB appreciation, and SOE reform, using a calibrated numerical general equilibrium model of 
China with SOE production and monetary structure. For the SOE manufacturing sector, we use 
the managerial control model of SOEs used in Whalley & Zhang(2006) and Fosse & 
Raimondos-Møller(2009). In this SOEs are assumed to be under managerial control with 
managers politically appointed. Capital is assumed allocated to the SOE by credit rationing, 
with an assumed state bank recapitalization mechanism which covers any losses. In effect, 
capital is freely allocated. This more accurately reflects China in the 1980’s and early 1990’s 
more so than today, but is analytically tractable and significant elements of this structure 
remain. We assume that enterprise managers maximize personal gain from networking and 
political connections and hence that enterprise managers maximize enterprise size rather than 
profits. The implication is that if managers hire labour in a competitive labour market (a strong 
simplifying assumption) and pay labour its going wage, they will hire labour up to the point 
that the product price equals the average value product of labour, rather than the marginal 
value product as in the competitive case. 
 
On the monetary side we follow Wang & Whalley (2007), and specify a simple monetary 
regime in a model with monetary non-neutralities. In this, monetary policy is non 
accommodative to the chosen fixed exchange rate, and given the current Renminbi peg this 
implies excess supply of foreign exchange which the Central Bank simply accumulates as 
reserves.  
 
 More formally, the model incorporates 2 countries (China and ROW) indexed by  j  or k  
( 1, 2 j = ,1 , 2 k = ) to denote country ,and 2 traded goods (manufactures and other indexed 
i (1 , 2 i = ) to denotes goods. Goods across countries are heterogeneous (the Armington 
assumption). 
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  For each good i produced in country k , we define the seller’s price (net of tariff) as
k
i P , 
and allow each country  j  to impose tariffs at rate
k
ji t   ( country j ’s tariff on good i imported 
from country k ) on each imported good. Tariffs are set to zero for exports. Internal (gross of 
tariff ) prices for good i produced in country k  are thus 






ji P t P ] 1 [ + =                                                                                      (1) 
   On the production side in country 1(China), we consider a SOE manufacturing sector and a 
competitive other sector. Both sectors have decreasing returns production functions, with labor 
as the variable input. Capital used by the SOEs is fixed to reflect capital allocated to this sector 
by rationed credit and is unpriced with average product pricing of labor. Capital used in the 
other sector receives a rental return since it is immobile intersectorally. 
     In the SOE sector, the production function is 
                    
1 11 1 ()
M
MM M YL
α ϕ =                                                                                      (2) 
 
    where 
1
M Y  is manufacturing output in country 1, 
1
M L is labour used in  manufacturing, 
1
M ϕ is 
a units term(scalar parameter), and 
1 1 M α <  is the production exponent.  
 
   The use of capital by the SOE is captured by a fixed factor. Capital is assumed to be 
allocated via centralized credit allocation through the state banking system, but recipients of 
loans (and hence capital) expect that any servicing costs of the loan will be covered by state 
bank recapitalization of losses. We assume managers of the enterprise are politically appointed 
and are concerned with the size of their personal network rather than profits, and networking 
benefits are collinear with the size of the enterprise they manage. In this simple model with a 
single SOE, labour is paid its average value product since managers maximize enterprise size 
measured by output 
1
M Y  subject to the enterprise budget constraint. 
 Since capital is effectively unpriced, this implies that 
                            
11 11 1
M MM M M PY w L R =+                                                                             (3) 
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     where 
1
M R  is any surplus required to be transferred to the state by the SOE. This, in turn, 
implies that labour receive its average value product plus its share of required surplus rather 
than its marginal product, and that implies that conditions for Pareto efficiency are violated. 
     In the other sector, the production function is 
                                   
1 11 1 ()
O
OO O YL
α ϕ =                                                                               (5) 
    Where 
1
O Y  is output in the other sector in country 1, 
1
O L is labour used in the  other sector, 
1
O ϕ is a units term(scalar parameter), and 
1 1 O α <  is the production exponent. We assume that in 
this sector labour is paid its marginal product, i.e. the wage rate is  
      
1
1
1 11 1 1 1 1
1 ()
O O









                                                                                (6) 
  and the residual return  
11 11 () OO OO PY w L −  accrues as rent to already invested capital.                                        
    In country 2 (rest of the world), the production functions are: 
    
2 22 2 ()
i
ii i YL
α ϕ = (, iM O = )                                                                                         (7) 
    The 
2
i Y  are manufacturing output and other sector output in country 2, 
2
i L  are labour used 
in manufacturing sector and other sector, 
2
i ϕ  are units terms (scalar parameters), and 
2 1 i α <   is 
the production exponent. We assume that in both sectors labour is  paid its marginal product, 
i.e. the wage rate is  
   
2
2
1 2 2 222 2
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   On the demand side of the model, final demands for commodities in country 1 and country 
2 as modeled are derived from maximization of CES nested utility functions defined over 
composites of similar domestically produced and imported goods subject to country budget 
constraints. This Armington structure allows us to directly incorporate substitution elasticity 
parameters into the model as the substitution elasticity between similar domestic and imported 
goods which can then be directly related to import demand elasticities. 
      Unlike in a conventional trade model, we incorporate endogenously determined trade 
surpluses and deficits directly into the two country budget constraints. To do this we use a   8
simple monetized extension to a pure barter trade model with a transactions demand for money 
and unitary velocity of circulation.  We assume that the surplus country is predetermined as 
country 1 (China) and the deficit country as country 2 (the rest of the world), and Country 1 
fixes its exchange rate and has non-accommodative monetary policy. Country 2 is assumed to 
fix its money stock to accommodate its trade deficit. This implies that jointly countries 1 and 2 
set relative money stocks consistent with the fixed country 1 exchange rate and trade surplus, 
but monetary non neutralities result. A change in the fixed exchange rate changes both trade 
flows and country 1’s surplus. 
  Maximizing country 1’s utility yields demands from the solution to a 2 stage budgeting 
problem, ie: 
)} , ( { max
12 11
1 1 i i D D C U                                                                                                    (9) 
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    where  1 C  is the CES composite of domestic demand and imports in country 1,  ) (
12 11
i i D D  is 
the demand in country 1 for good iproduced in country 1 (2), and e is the fixed exchange 
rate,S is the trade surplus of country 1,  1 TR  is the tariff revenue in country 1 , and  1 R  are 
transfers to the state by the SOE in country 1. These are assumed recycled to consumers as 
lump sum transfers. 
    Country 2’s demands are similarly derived by maximizing a nested CES utility function 
defined over CES composites of imported goods from country 1 and domestically produced 
goods, i.e. 
)} , ( { max
21 22
2 2 i i D D C U  
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We assume each country’s money supply is fixed at  1 m  and  2 m , and for simplicity, each 
country has a constant unit velocity transactions demand for money. In equilibrium, this 
implies: 




i i m D P D P 1
21 1 11 1                                                                            (13)                                  




i i m S D P D P 2
12 2 22 2                                                                     (14) 
since the surpluses of country 1 implies money holding in the currency of 2 ($) 
Adding demand supply equalities in goods gives 
        
1 21 11
i i i Y D D = +       ( , iM O = )                                                                     (15) 
        
2 22 22
i i i Y D D = +      ( , iM O = )                                                                     (16) 
 and factor market clearing conditions  
       
111
MO LLL +=                                                                                                  (17) 
      
222
MO LLL +=  
In equilibrium, factor prices are equalized across the two sectors in country 2, and wage 
rates are equalized across the two sectors in each country, i.e. 
     
11
AM ww =                                                                                                          (18) 
     
22
AM ww =  
    and sellers commodity prices clear goods markets. These prices are consistent with zero 
profit conditions in country 2 and SOE pricing the determination of rent in the other section in 
country 1. 
We can build a model admissible data set for 2006 for this structure which we use to 
determine model parameters through calibration and then perform counterfactual experiments 
for changes in different policy elements. Alternative equilibria can easily be computed for this 
system.   10
3. Data and Model Calibration 
        We build a model compatible benchmark general equilibrium data set which we use in 
calibration. We use a base year of  2006 . The two countries in our simulations are China and 
the Rest of the World. Our base case data includes 2006 trade, production,  consumption and 
country money supply data constructed to equal the value of transactions assuming unitary 
velocity.  
 
         In the model, for simplicity, we treat the entire manufacturing sector as a single SOE. 
This is a strong assumption which ignores China’s growing private manufacturing sector and 
the role of inward FDI flows. It is adopted as a simplification for purposes of tractability. The 
whole Chinese manufacturing sector is also treated as producing a single product. We define 
physical units for both manufacturing and the other sector product to be related to value 
observations from national accounts following the Harberger(1962) and Shoven & 
Whalley(1972)  units convention that in the initial benchmark equilibrium data world prices are 
unity, i.e.
12 1 2 1 MMOO PPPP ==== , and factor prices are unity, i.e. 
12 1 2 1 MMOO wwww = === .    
 
     To convert Chinese data into units consistent with the ROW data in $, we construct an 
artificial Chinese currency unit,  * RMB , which we set as  *7 . 9 7 2 RMB RMB = , which is the 
exchange rate of the US dollar to Renminbi in 2006. This implies that 1 unit of  * RMB  equals 
1 US dollar. This convention is adopted so that in calibration all equilibrium prices will be 
unity for both Chinese and ROW goods and factors. 
 
In Table 1 ,GDP data is from the World Bank’s WDI database  and trade data is taken 
from the UNCOMTRADE database. F.o.b. exports values as reported by exporting countries 
are used,  China’s exports and imports are taken as imports and exports by the rest of the world 
from and to China. These trade data , in turn, imply China’s trade surplus for 2006. Labor input 
data is from China’s NBS data and from the U.S. Bureau of Labor of Statistics. We assume the 
labor input of ROW is 4 times that of U.S. on the basis that U.S. GDP is roughly ¼ of world 
GDP China. Tariff data is from the WTO Statistical Database, and for 2006, the average tariff 
on China’s manufactured import was  9% , and on other goods was 15.8%.   11
Elasticities in the central case model specification are set as follows. There are no 
available estimates of elasticities for China either on the demand or production sides. We set 
the substitution elasticities in demands between domestic and imported commodities at 1 in 
both countries. We later use senstitivity analysis to change this value. The substitution 
elasticities between two domestic goods in each country we set at 0.5 and the substitution 
elasticities between the two imported goods in each country are also set at 0.5. For China’s 
SOE manufacturing sector, first order conditions imply no value directly for the exponent in 
the production function. We assume a value of 
1 0.4 M α = ,which we loosely justify as the  share 
of labor in total manufacturing output from the NBS (China’s National Bureau of Statistics) 
data, which in the competitive (rather than the SOE ) case. This yields a value of 
1
M ϕ  from 























Manufacture  1293.83  1293.83     377.81  916.02  604.33  311.69 
Other Sector  1364.05  1130.68  1311.13  52.92  187.13  -134.21 
Surplus  177.47                
Exchange rate  1:1                
1 m   2657.88                
 
ROW 













Manufacture 12436.77  1979.12  11832.44  604.33  916.02  -311.69 
Other Sector  36426.56  7074.27  36239.43  187.13  52.92  134.21 
Surplus -177.47          
Exchange rate  1:1           
2 m   49040.8                
 
       
                                                 
2 We construct an artificial Chinese currency unit, RMB*, we set it as RBM*=7.972RMB, which is the exchange 
rate of the US dollar to Renminbi in 2006, this implies that 1 unit
* RMB equals 1 US dollar. This convention is 
adapted so that in calibration all equilibrium prices will be unity. 
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     Table 2 reports the parameter values in production and preferences generated by calibration. 





Model Parameterizations Generated by Calibration to the 2006 Benchmark Data 
 
A. Parameters in Production Functions 




exponent on  
labor inputα  
Technology 
coefficientϕ  
exponent on  
labor inputα  
Manufacturing 
102.379   0.405   3716.421   0.159  
Other Sector 
4.017   0.829   6513.066   0.194  
B.  Parameters in Nested CES Utility Functions 
  China  Rest of the World 
Shares of Domestic and Import composite goods 
 Domestic  Produced  Imports  Domestic Produced  Imports 
  0.659 0.341  0.979  0.021 
Shares of  manufacturing and other goods 
 Domestic  Produced  Imports  Domestic Produced  Imports 
Manufacturing  0.077 0.908  0.096  0.996 
Other Sector  0.923 0.092  0.904  0.004 
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4. Numerical Analysis of Different Liberalization Policies in China 
     We have used our calibrated model to simulate the impacts of various forms of economic 
liberalization policies on welfare, trade flows, and the trade surplus and on production. The 
liberalization policies include tariff elimination, a freely floating exchange rate, and SOE 
reform. Results are presented in Table 3 to Table 6. We reports impacts on welfare using 
Hicksian money metric measures of welfare change. We calculate these as % of GDP. 
These results suggest that SOE reform and a freely floating exchange rate have more 
impact on China’s welfare than tariff liberalization using 2006 data. RMB appreciation and an 
increase in China’s money stock reduces China’s trade surplus as would be expected. But 
impacts on exports are small. Most of the impact is on imports. For trade flows, in the 
traditional competitive model, trade liberalization influences both imports and exports, while in 
our model, with an endogenously determined trade surplus, tariff liberalization has no effect on 
exports. Impacts instead are on imports and the trade surplus. SOE reform of China’s 
manufacturing sector significantly decreases the production of China’s manufacturing sector 
and increases the production of China’s other sectors. 
      In Table 3, we use our central model specification to analyze the impacts of three different 
policy elements in liberalization. For tariff elimination, we eliminate the tariff on both China’s 
manufacturing and other sectors. In exchange rate policy, we freely float China’s exchange rate 
and the trade surplus becomes zero. For SOE reform, we assume China’s manufacturing sector 
changes from SOEs to competitive enterprises.  
The first column of Table 3 reports the impacts of China’s different economic 
liberalization policies on welfare using Hicksian CV measures. Welfare impacts using 
Hicksian  EVs are similar and so in the tables, we only report the results for CVs. The most 
effective policy to improve China’s welfare is SOE reform, the welfare impact on China is 
12.212% of GDP, freely floating exchange is also effective with a welfare impact of 11.093% 
of GDP, but for tariff elimination  the welfare impact on China is only 3.124% of GDP.    14
     In the second column of Table 3, we report the impacts of different Chinese liberalization 
policies on trade flows.  With a freely floating exchange rate, China’s imports increase in value 
terms by around 22%. The increase of the imports of manufacturing and other sectors are 
similar at nearly 22%. For tariff elimination, China’s imports increase in value terms by over 
10%. Manufacturing imports increase by 9.885% and the other sector imports increase by 
12.937%.  For SOE reform, the impact on China’s imports is very small, only -0.051%. In this 
model specification, the impact of all liberalizations on exports is very small. The 
endogenously determined trade surplus acts as a buffer adjusting to the policy change so that 
imports change sharply with little change in exports. 
      In the third column of Table 3, we report the impacts of alternative Chinese liberalization 
policies on production.  SOE reform decreases production in China’s manufacturing sector by 
over 16% in quantity terms, and increases the production of China’s other sectors by 29% in 
quantity terms. Under a freely floating exchange rate, the production of China’s manufacturing 
sector decreases by 3% in quantity terms, and the production of China’s other sectors increases 
by 6%. Tariff elimination has little effect on China’s production since exports do not respond. 




Table  3 
Welfare, Trade and Production Impacts of Model Based 
Evaluations of Alternative Liberalizations 
 
(Model with SOE average Product Labor Pricing and Monetary non-Neutralities / Trade Surpluses) 
(Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods =1,  
1 0.4 M α =  ) 
 
 
  Welfare Impact as % GDP 
(Hicksian Measure)  % Change in China’s imports  % Change in   % Change in production 






1.Tariff Elimination  3.124%  -0.164%  10.607%  9.885%  12.937%  0.000%  0.000% 0.000%  0.085%  -0.029% 
2.Freely Floating 
Exchange rate 
11.093%  -0.517%  22.237%  22.431%  21.610%  -0.010%  -3.178% 6.248%  0.201%  -0.069% 
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     In Table 4 we present results from the three different forms of liberalization using three 
different models: the model with both SOE pricing and non-neutral money as used for Table 3, 
a model with only SOE pricing (neutral money) and a classical competitive model with neither 
of these features. Our purpose is to compare the welfare, trade and production impacts of 
alternative liberalizations across models to gauge how important elements of Chinese 
economic structure are for policy evaluation.  
 
    We see large difference among the results form these three models. For tariff elimination, in 
the competitive model, China’s welfare decreases by -1.002% of GDP due to an adverse term 
of trade effect. Adding SOE pricing and keeping money neutral increases the negative impact 
on China’s welfare to -1.581% as the terms of trade effects intensify. But in the model with 
SOE pricing and non-neutral money, China’s welfare increases by 3.124% of GDP.  In this 
model, tariff elimination has little effect on exports, since most of the impact is directed to the 
surplus, while in competitive model and model with only SOE pricing, the effects of tariff 
elimination on imports and exports are similar. For SOE reform, the non-neutral money model 
shows a welfare gain of 12.212% of GDP and the neutral money model shows an even higher 
welfare gain of 15.825% of GDP. The latter model results show that SOE reform has a 
significant effect on China’s imports (41.580%) and exports (31.561%).  
   17
Table 4 
Comparing Welfare, Trade and Production Impacts of  
Alternative Liberalizations Across Models 
 
(Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods=1,  
1 0.4 M α =  ) 
 
  Model with SOE pricing and  
non-neutral money 
Model with only SOE pricing 
 (neutral money) 
Competitive 
 Model
  Welfare Impact  
as % GDP 
(Hicksian Measure) 
% Change in 
China’s 
imports 
% Change in 
China’s 
exports 
Welfare Impact as % GDP 
(Hicksian Measure) 






Welfare Impact as % 
GDP 
(Hicksian Measure)





exports    China ROW  China  ROW  China  ROW 
1.Tariff 
Elimination  3.124%  -0.164%  10.607% 0.000% -1.581% 0.041% 7.317% 5.554% -1.022% 0.061% 8.709% 7.114%
2.Freely Floating 
Exchange rate  11.093%  -0.517%  22.237% -0.010% -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
3. SOE reform  12.212%  -0.468%  -0.051% 0.092% 15.825% -0.641% 41.580% 31.561% -  -  -  - 
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    Table 5 then reports more detailed analyses of alternative liberalization impacts using our central 
case model. In the trade policy component, we first eliminate only tariffs on manufactures, and then 
eliminate only other sector tariffs. In monetary policy, we first consider RMB appreciation of 5%,10% 
respectively with a fixed money stock in both China and the Rest of the World, then we fix the RMB 
exchange rate and increase the  money stock in China by 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
      Results in Table 5 show that monetary policy again seemingly has more impact than tariff 
liberalization on China’s welfare , trade and production, while Renminbi appreciation and increasing 
monetary stock have similar impacts. With RMB appreciation of 5% and 10%, China’s welfare gains 
are 4.215% and 8.039% of GDP respectively, while with an increase in China’s money stock of  
5%,10%, China’s welfare gains are 4.224%, 8.110% of GDP respectively, and elimination only of 
China’s manufacturing tariffs leads to China’s welfare gains of 1.986% of GDP. Elimination of only 
other sector tariffs leads to Chinese welfare gains by 1.129% of GDP. In the base model; tariff 
liberalization and monetary policy have little impact on exports. The largest impact is on imports and 
the surplus. With RMB appreciation of 5% and 10%, China’s imports increase by 8.283%, 17.487%  
respectively, with increase in China’s monetary stock by  5%,10%, China’s imports increase by 
7.869%, 15.738%  respectively, and elimination only of China’s manufacturing tariffs leads to a 
Chinese import increase of 6.756%. Elimination only of other sector tariffs leads to a Chinese import 
increase of 3.613%. Trade policy has little effect on production, while under Renminbi appreciation 
and an increase in China’s monetary stock China’s manufacturing production decreases and China’s 
other sector production increases.  19
Table 5 
More Detailed Analysis of Alternative Liberalization Impacts  
(Model with SOE average Product Labor Pricing and Monetary non-Neutralities/Surpluses) 
(Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods=1,  
1 0.4 M α =  ) 
 
  Welfare Impact as % GDP 
(Hicksian Measure)  % Change in China’s imports  % Change in   % Change in production 







Manufacturing tariffs  1.986%  -0.103%  6.756%  7.894%  3.081%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.076%  -0.026% 
2.Elimination only other 
sector tariffs  1.129%  -0.057%  3.613%  1.788%  9.505%  0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  0.008%  -0.003% 
3. 5% Renminbi 
appreciation  4.215%  -0.194%  8.283%  8.347%  8.074%  -0.004%  -1.256%  2.514%  0.075%  -0.026% 
4. 10% Renminbi 
appreciation  8.039%  -0.407%  17.487%  17.634%  17.011%  -0.008%  -2.548%  5.040%  0.158%  -0.054% 
5. 5% increase in China’s 
monetary stock  4.224%  -0.185%  7.869%  7.930%  7.672%  -0.004%  -1.195%  2.394%  0.072%  -0.024% 
6. 10% increase in China’s 
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       Three  parameters in the model are crucial for these results. One is the top level trade elasticities; a 
 second is the bottom level trade elasticities, the third is 
1
M α  in the production function of China’s SOE 
manufacturing sector. We thus perform sensitivity analyses on the results in Table 3 by varying these 
three parameters. 
Table 6 provides the results. The welfare effect of tariff elimination is very sensitive to the top level 
elasticities used, while changing the bottom level trade elasticities has little impact on welfare effects 
of tariff elimination. With varying 
1
M α  the welfare impacts of trade elimination and freely floating 
exchange rates change greatly. When the 
1
M α changes from 0.4 to 0.75, the welfare impacts of tariff 
elimination changes from 3.124% to 11.979% . The welfare impact of freely floating exchange rate 
changes from  11.093% to 17.386% ,the welfare effect of SOE reform changes from 12.212% to 
14.630%.But while results are elasticity dependent, the theme of results that departures from the 
classical competitive model matters greatly for results remains. 




Table  6 
Sensitivity Analyses of the Results on the Impacts of Alternative Liberalizations in Table 3 







  Welfare Impact as % GDP 
(Hicksian Measure)
  China ROW 
1.Tariff Elimination   
Central Case   3.124% -0.164% 
½ top level trade elasticities  0.498% -0.081% 
Increase  top level trade elasticities by 50%  5.220% -0.244% 
½ bottom  level trade  elasticities  3.065% -0.161% 
Double bottom level trade elasticities  3.173% -0.166% 
Set production exponent in SOE sector to 0.75  11.979% 8.979% 
   
2.Freely Floating Exchange rate   
Central Case   11.093% -0.517% 
½ top level trade elasticities  6.074% -0.309% 
Increase  top level trade elasticities by 50%  11.471% -0.792% 
½ bottom  level trade  elasticities  9.556% -0.495% 
Double bottom level trade elasticities  9.882% -0.543% 
Set production exponent in SOE sector to 0.75  17.386% 8.643% 
   
3.SOE Reform   
Central Case   12.212% -0.468% 
½ top level trade elasticities  10.944% -0.050% 
Increase  top level trade elasticities by 50%  12.981% -1.370% 
½ bottom  level trade  elasticities  12.433% -0.514% 
Double bottom level trade elasticities  11.824% -0.383% 
Set production exponent in SOE sector to 0.75  14.630% 9.226%   22
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we present numerical general equilibrium models of China with SOE behavior and 
non-neutral monetary structure that capture in a simplified form features of Chinese economic 
structure missing in conventional competitive models. We calibrate these models to 2006 data , and 
using the calibrated parameters, we analyze the impacts of three different liberalization policies on 
welfare and trade flows: tariff liberalization, a freely floating RMB exchange rate, and SOE reform. 
We note that China’s economy is quite different from a typical OECD market economy, and so it is 
important to assess how far the competitive model now widely used in numerical simulation work on 
China can be misleading. 
In our model, for the manufacturing SOE sector, we use the managerial control model of SOEs in 
Whalley & Zhang(2006) and Fosse & Raimondos-Møller(2009).In this SOEs are assumed to be under 
managerial control with managers politically appointed. Capital is assumed allocated freely to the SOE 
by state bank credit rationing with a recapitalization mechanism covering losses. We assume that 
enterprise managers seek to maximize personal gain from networking and political connections. We 
thus assume that enterprise managers seek to maximize enterprise size rather than profits. We add non-
neutral monetary structure into our trade mode as in Wang & Whalley(2007), to reflect the actual 
Chinese exchange rate and monetary regime. In this model monetary policy is non accommodative to 
the chosen fixed exchange rate, and at 2006 exchange rates this implies excess supply of foreign 
exchange and reserve accumulation. 
Counterfactual model results show that large differences in policy impacts relative to a classical 
competitive model, including differences of sign. SOE reform and a freely floating Chinese exchange 
rate are more effective policies for improving China’s welfare than tariff liberalization. Policies of 
RMB appreciation and increasing China’s money stock reduce China’s trade surplus. In the   
traditional competitive model, trade liberalization impacts both imports and exports, while in our 
central case model, with an endogenously determined trade surplus, trade liberalization has little effect 
on exports. Most of the impact is on imports and the trade surplus. SOE reform of China’s 
manufacturing sector significantly decreases production of China’s manufacturing sector and increases 
production in China’s other sectors. 
   23
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